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ADAM KHAYAT
MARY DOES NOT LEARN 
ANYTHING NEW: 
APPLYING KIM’S CRITIQUE OF MENTAL 
CAUSATION TO THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT 
AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS
ABSTRACT
Within the discourse surrounding mind-body interaction, mental causation 
is intimately associated with non-reductive physicalism. However, such a 
theory holds two opposing views:  that all causal properties and relations can 
be explicated by physics and that special sciences have an explanatory role. 
Jaegwon Kim attempts to deconstruct this problematic contradiction by 
arguing that it is untenable for non-reductive physicalists to explain human 
behavior by appeal to mental properties. In combination, Kim’s critique of 
mental causation and the phenomenal concept strategy serves as an effectual 
response to the anti-physicalist stance enclosed within the Knowledge 
Argument and the Zombie Thought Experiment.
The viability of mental causation in the discourse of mind-body 
interaction is an assumed tenet in psychology. This is also intimately 
associated with non-reductive physicalism, which holds that though 
everything can be explained via reduction to physics, there are multiple 
methods of describing physical reality. Therefore, various areas of the 
specials sciences—such as psychology, economics, and biology—are 
more abstract and have the capacity to satisfy certain descriptive and 
explanatory interests that fundamental physics cannot.1 This approach 
is relevant to the philosophical discussions surrounding the Knowledge 
Argument and the significance of zombies. The Knowledge Argument, 
as presented by Frank Jackson, claims that conscious experience 
necessitates non-physical properties.2 First put forth by David 
Chalmers, the Zombie Thought Experiment was constructed to 
elucidate issues concerning the relationship between consciousness and 
the physical world.3 
Nevertheless, non-reductive physicalism seems to hold two opposing 
views: that all causal properties and relations can be explicated by 
physics and that special sciences have an explanatory role. Jaegwon Kim 
attempts to deconstruct this problematic contradiction by arguing that 
it is untenable for non-reductive physicalists to explain human behavior 
by appeal to mental properties. This paper is divided into three sections: 
Section I will discuss the principles of externalism, causal closure, 
and explanatory exclusion and how they pose problems for mental 
causation within a physicalist framework—they will also be applied to 
the Knowledge Argument; Section II will propose and critically appraise 
various rebuttals to the exclusion argument; Section III will attempt to 
apply Kim’s reasoning to the Zombie Thought Experiment.
1 William Jaworski, Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction 
(Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 129.
2 Martina Nida-Rümelin, “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument,” The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, last modified November 23, 2009, https://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/qualia-knowledge/.
3 Robert Kirk, “Zombies,” The Standard Encyclopedia of Philosophy, last 
modified March 16, 2015, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/
entries/zombies/.
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I.
Kim begins his argument with the following question: through 
what mechanism or process does a mental event manage to initiate, 
or insert itself into, a causal chain of physical events?4 Such an inquiry 
stems from the ambiguity surrounding how mental states could 
directly influence neurophysical mechanisms. This intermingling of 
categorically different substances—as hypothesized by Descartes—
would imply that the nonphysical mind must be able to affect the 
conditions of the physical mind; nevertheless, this interaction has not 
been adequately clarified.5
Conversely, one of the most discussed arguments against 
physicalism—the Knowledge Argument—is predicated upon the 
notion that complete physical knowledge of a conscious entity would 
not also encompass the experience of being that entity. Frank Jackson 
presents this with a thought experiment about a brilliant scientist 
named Mary: 
1. Mary understands all the neurophysical information regarding human  
color vision before her release from a monochrome environment. 
2. However, before her release, there is some information that she lacks 
concerning the subjective experience of color.
3. Therefore, not all information is physical information.6
The purported conclusion derived from this example is that there are 
certain truths regarding the subjective experience, or qualia, of seeing 
red that escapes the neurophysical one; thus, physicalism is incomplete.
As a thesis about semantic content, externalism serves as a 
significant challenge to the utilization of mental causation within a 
physicalist framework to explain behavior. Accordingly, the process 
of individuating mental states requires consideration of the physical 
environment and the linguistic standards of one’s surrounding 
community.7 Thus, the content of intentional states is extrinsic.8 
This is problematic in that causation is intuitively understood to 
involve intrinsic features. Consequently, the externalist ways of 
characterizing the content of mental states makes them unsuitable 
for causal involvement.9 When contextualized within psychology, 
4 Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind (Westview Press, 1996), 439.
5 Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 443.
6 Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” in Mind and Cognition: An 
Anthology, ed. William G. Lycan and Jesse J. Prinz (MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2008), 659.
7 Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” Minnesota Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science 7 (1975): 131-193.
8 Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 445.
9 Julie Yoo, “Mental Causation,” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
last modified 2006, https://www.iep.utm.edu/mental-c/#SH3bii.
the contents of beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes 
have no causal relevance; only the syntax is of significance.10 Kim 
illustrates this by presenting a classic example: Putnam’s Twin-Earth 
Thought Experiment. Accordingly, an Earthling refers to H2O upon 
utterance of “water” whereas a Twin-Earthling refers to XYZ—a 
superficially identical yet compositionally different substance—upon 
the same utterance. They behave in an identical fashion; however, 
when contemplating ideas about what they both call “water,” they 
are thinking about distinct things. The culminating conclusion is that 
the meanings of words are not holistically psychological—the content 
of mental states does not completely depend on intrinsic properties.11 
Therefore, mental states—which depend on extrinsic properties—lack 
causal relevance. With regards to Jackson’s thought experiment, it can 
be argued that the qualia from experiencing the various colors does not 
have any residual effect on Mary’s behavior.
Another argument against mental causation within a physicalist 
framework revolves around the causal closure of the physical domain. 
Cartesian interactionism postulates that both mental and physical 
events can occur as links within the same causal chain. To the contrary, 
physicalism is committed to the proposition that the only causes are 
physical causes; everything can be exhaustively described and explained 
by physics.12 Kim asserts that a physicalist must reject the mental 
realm as an ontological equal of the physical realm. Therefore, mental 
causation must be ruled out.13 Nonetheless, non-reductive physicalists 
maintain that certain systems can have irreducible mental properties. 
Such a position is at odds with physicalism and is thus unsustainable.
The problem of explanatory exclusion emerges from the non-
reductive physicalist view that mental causes are distinct from physical 
causes. Instantiations of mental properties are associated with particular 
physical properties. These physical properties can be seamlessly 
integrated within a causal chain that produces behavioral effects; 
however, this seems to make mental properties to be causally stagnant 
and thus “excluded” from causal explanation.14 Moreover, if both 
the mental property and the physical property are said to be causal, 
a case of overdetermination results.15 This seems to contravene the 
“maxim of explanatory simplification,” which seeks to explain behavior 
10 Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 452.
11 Putnam, “Meaning of ‘Meaning’,”
12 William Jaworski, “Mental Causation from the Top-Down,” Erkenntnis, 65, 
no. 2 (2006): 68.
13 Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 453.
14 John Heil and David Robb, “Mental Causation,” The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, last modified October 10, 2018, https://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/mental-causation/.
15 Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 455.
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with the fewest posited premises.16 Additionally, it is unclear how a 
certain mental state can catalyze a series of neurophysical mechanisms. 
This problem can be best articulated by the following set of jointly 
inconsistent claims: 
1. Actions have mental causes.
2. Actions have physical causes.
3. Mental causes and physical causes are distinct.
4. An action does not have more than one cause.17
Claims 1 through 3 indicate that actions can have multiple causes, 
whereas Claim 4 suggests that they do not. Consequently, for a non-
reductive physicalist, denunciation of one of the claims is needed 
to maintain argumentative coherence; however, this is difficult. 
Rejecting the first claim would be problematic for a non-reductive 
physicalist: to deny the existence of mental events or their causal 
influence seems to contradict the theory’s basic premises. Rejecting 
the second claim would be at odds with non-reductivists’ commitment 
to physicalism.18 Rejecting the third claim would contradict non-
reductivists’ commitment to anti-reductivism.19 Rejecting the fourth 
claim insinuates that events can be causally overdetermined. According 
to Kim, either mental events are realized by, or supervene on, physical 
events; nevertheless, in both cases, mental events require physical 
events to exist and therefore both cannot provide independent and fully 
satisfactory causes for actions.20 
These components of Kim’s argument are relevant to discussions 
surrounding the Knowledge Argument. By function of the principles 
of externalism, causal closure, and explanatory exclusion, the qualia 
associated with seeing color for the first time does not confer novel 
information regarding the neurophysical facts of human vision. The 
content of the derived qualia lacks causal significance.
Kim discusses various models that could explicate the role of 
mental events.21 The epiphenomenalist model asserts that mental states 
are mere byproducts of neurophysical states and lack any causal role. 
The model of supervenient causation views mental states as a potential 
cause due to its supervenience on neurophysical states. The reductionist 
model—which Kim considers to be the most efficacious and simple—
identifies mental states with neurophysical states, which function as the 
only stimulus for other physical states.
16 Jaegwon Kim, “Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion,” 
Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989): 93.
17 Jaworski, “Mental Causation from the Top-Down,” 170.
18 Jaworski, “Mental Causation from the Top-Down,” 171.
19 Jaworski, “Mental Causation from the Top-Down,” 129.
20 Jaworski, “Mental Causation from the Top-Down,” 172.
21 Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 455. 
II.
Though the contentions proposed by Kim are challenging for non-
reductive physicalism, there are various responses.
One potential reply to the exclusion argument falls within the 
designation “autonomy solutions.” As previously discussed, Kim 
argues that non-reductive physicalism is guilty of pitting higher-level 
mental properties against their corresponding lower-level neurophysical 
properties in determining causation.22 However, according to some, 
this description is reductionist and deceptive; rather, psychological 
justifications—and others in the special sciences—are independent 
of physical explanations in that they refer to their own collection of 
rules and abstract away from the details of physical explanations.23 
Subsequently, exclusion of mental causation can be prevented within a 
physicalist framework; both descriptions can coexist. 
This approach is best illustrated by the dual explanandum strategy. 
Accordingly, purely physical explanations of behavior are not capable 
of satisfying certain explanatory interests: why Syria is engulfed in 
conflict cannot be explained via the interaction of molecules and 
atoms. In his argumentation, Kim produces a paradox of psychological 
explanation: he claims that psychological explanations—which refer to 
mental states—lack objective status and are excluded by neurophysical 
explanations, which, in turn, are incapable of fulfilling explanatory 
interests that fall within the domain of psychological explanations.24 
An unappealing ultimatum results: either neurophysical statements—
which can elucidate objective relations but cannot answer certain 
special questions—or psychological statements—which can answer 
certain special questions but cannot describe objective relations—are 
accepted. In contrast, the dual explanandum strategy revolves around 
the notion that causation cannot be extricated from the explanatory 
schemes in which it functions.25 It argues that the causal relations that 
emerge from psychological explanations and neurophysical explanations 
serve different purposes; they form mutually exclusive and autonomous 
causal lines that are relevant to different properties of the end effect.26 
Neurophysical explanations can describe the interaction of atoms, 
whereas psychological explanations can clarify “the successful or 
unsuccessful interaction of organisms with their natural, historical and 
cultural environment.”27 
22 Heil and Robb, “Mental Causation.”
23 Frank Jackson, “Mental Causation,” Mind 105, no. 419 (1996): 386.
24 Karsten R. Stueber, “Mental Causation and the Paradoxes of Explanation,” 
Philosophical Studies 122, no. 3 (2005): 256.
25 Yoo, “Mental Causation.”
26 Heil and Robb, “Mental Causation.”
27 Stueber, “Mental Causation and the Paradoxes of Explanation,” 256.
St
an
ce
 V
ol
um
e 
12
 / 
Ap
ril 
20
19
50
M
ar
y 
Do
es
 N
ot
 L
ea
rn
 A
ny
th
ing
 N
ew
51
This separation can be described by differentiating “triggering” 
and “structuring” causes. The former refers to the mechanism by 
which a particular effect is induced and lies within the purview of 
neurophysical explanations; the latter refers to the motive for why a 
particular effect is induced and lies within the purview of psychological 
explanations.28 For example, the thermostat activates the furnace due 
to a low external temperature (triggering), but the organization of the 
circuitry forms the pre-conditions (structuring) that enable the low 
temperature to exert its effect.29 With respect to the human mind, the 
external conditions that galvanize bodily behavior are mediated by the 
agent’s learning history.30 
Nonetheless, it has been argued that this strategy violates the causal 
closure of the physical domain. By claiming that certain aspects of the 
final effect can be attributed to causes that are irreducibly mental, the 
proposition of physicalism is infringed.31 If this is not the case, then the 
problem of exclusion persists.32 This is an unsustainable position for a 
non-reductive physicalist to hold. 
Another reply to the exclusion argument is classified as the 
“inheritance solution.” This is derived from a problem associated with 
Kim’s critique: a property needs to be causally efficacious in the process 
of production for it to be considered as causally relevant to the production 
of certain effects.33 Accordingly, what deems a property to be causally 
efficacious is that its instantiation leads to the manifestation of the effect. 
However, it has been argued that a distinction can be made between that 
which is causally relevant and that which is causally efficacious. From this, 
it follows that a psychological explanation is inefficacious but relevant 
because “its realization programs for the realization of a lower-order 
efficacious property and, in the circumstances, for the occurrence of the 
event in question.”34 In other words, it acquires this causal relevance due 
to its close interaction with its neurophysical realizer.35 Psychological 
explanations and neurophysical explanations are not in competition for 
causation but are rather in cooperation; this circumvents the problem of 
causal overdetermination.36
Though this solution seems to be effective, counterarguments 
can be proposed. One is that causal inheritance is simply a form of 
28 Fred Dretske, “Reasons and Causes,” Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989): 10.
29 Dretske, “Reasons and Causes,” 11.
30 Yoo, “Mental Causation.”
31 Kim, “Mechanism, Purpose,” 101.
32 Yoo, “Mental Causation.”
33 Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, “Program Explanation: A General 
Perspective,” Analysis 50, no. 2 (1990): 111.
34 Jackson and Pettit, “A General Perspective,” 115.
35 Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, “Functionalism and Broad Content,” Mind 
XCVII, no. 387 (1988): 399.
36 Heil and Robb, “Mental Causation.”
supervenience causation.37 Accordingly, the mental property that 
is realized by its neurophysical counterpart is neither necessary nor 
informative; reduction is the only solution. Another identifies causal 
inheritance as a mere appeal to epiphenomenalism.38 Since causal 
inheritance credits causal relevance to mental properties in virtue of 
their physical realizers, they “mental properties” have no inherent and 
independent causal power. Thus, they are superfluous. 
The various replies to the exclusion argument have not been 
effective. They seem to indirectly appeal to mental causes as being 
ontologically equal to neurophysical causes in that they affect some 
aspect of the end result. Such an implication contradicts the basic thesis 
of physicalism. Kim’s argument is successful in indicating that the 
non-reductive physicalist position is unmaintainable by analyzing the 
contradictory nature of its fundamental premises. It is also noteworthy 
in that its assertions are relevant to multiple philosophical contexts. 
With respect to the problem of consciousness in a physical world, 
implementation of Kim’s approach begets interesting conclusions.
III.
An attempt at refuting the viability of physicalism, the Zombie 
Thought Experiment is founded upon a simple hypothetical scenario: 
there exists a system that is physically identical to a conscious entity 
but lacks that consciousness completely.39 Such an approach presents a 
significant challenge to physicalism in that it obeys the casual closure 
of the physical domain, yet maintains that a fully physical account 
is insufficient: it does not describe how it is “to be like” something. 
From this, Chalmers differentiates between the “easy” and “hard” 
problems of consciousness.40 Accordingly, the former revolves around 
the neurophysical processes that underlie discerning stimuli, reporting 
information, or assessing internal states; such activities embody puzzles 
that can be deciphered via empirical investigation. However, the latter 
involves the difficult prospect of reconciling the existence of qualia 
with a neurophysical description of the mind; an effective solution 
would require an explanation of the relationship between neurophysical 
processes and consciousness on the basis of natural principles. Chalmers 
introduces an epistemic argument to ground his contentions:
37 Jaegwon Kim, “Blocking Causal Drainage and Other Maintenance Choices 
with Mental Causation,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67, 
no. 1 (2003): 171.
38 Ivar Hannikainen, “Questioning the Causal Inheritance Principle,” Theoria: 
An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 
SEGUNDA EPOCA 25, no. 3(69) (2010): 275.
39 David Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 108.
40 Chalmers, Character of Consciousness, 105.
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1. There is an epistemic gap between neurophysical and  
phenomenal states.
2. If there is an epistemic gap between neurophysical and phenomenal 
states, then there is an ontological gap, and materialism is false. 
3. Thus, materialism is false.41
He then delineates three argumentative avenues by which materialists 
can oppose the epistemic argument: Type-A, Type-B, and  
Type-C materialism. 
Type-A materialism flatly denies Claim 1: there is no epistemic gap 
between neurophysical and phenomenal states. This approach denies 
the existence of consciousness and phenomenal states; descriptions 
of neurophysical processes can exhaustively explain human behavior. 
Chalmers suggests that such a stance is extremely counterintuitive and 
lacks a strong argument.42 
Type-B materialism accepts that there exists an epistemic gap but 
rejects Claim 2: there is no ontological gap. Consequently, phenomenal 
states can be identified with neurophysical states.43 An example of 
this would be the identification of water with H2O. Nevertheless, 
Chalmers claims that this approach is untenable; the epistemic gap 
with consciousness seems to be distinct from epistemic gaps in other 
domains. In other words, the identification between consciousness and 
neurophysical states is “epistemically primitive.” The identity is not 
deducible from the complete physical state.44 
Type-C materialism also accepts that there exists a deep epistemic 
gap between neurophysical and phenomenal states but claims that 
such a gap is closeable with further empirical investigation. Therefore, 
phenomenal states are deducible in principle from physical states, 
but these inferences are unavailable now.45 Chalmers contests the 
plausibility of this argument via a categorical approach. By not 
designating consciousness as a functional concept and by classifying 
physical descriptions of the world as structural-dynamic descriptions, 
Chalmers asserts that consciousness cannot be implied by a 
neurophysical description. Thus, either Type-A or Type-B materialism 
can be accepted; there is no distinct space for Type-C.46
Kim’s argument is relevant to this discussion in that his approach 
seems to embody a hybrid between Type-B and Type-C materialism 
and—via the principle of explanatory exclusion—rids consciousness 
41  Chalmers, Character of Consciousness, 112.
42  Jaworski, Philosophy of Mind, 215.
43  Chalmers, Character of Consciousness, 117.
44  Chalmers, Character of Consciousness, 118.
45  Chalmers, Character of Consciousness, 126.
46  Chalmers, Character of Consciousness, 130.
or qualia from any causal role in the physical realm. When combined 
with the phenomenal concept strategy, Kim’s reasoning can thus serve 
as a successful response to the Zombie Thought Experiment because 
it leads Chalmers to accept epiphenomenalism as the only viable 
solution. Subsequently, epiphenomenalism fails to integrate with a 
naturalistic worldview and to respond to the problem of psychophysical 
emergence.47 Therefore, Chalmers’ argument seems unsustainable.
As aforementioned, Kim advocates for a reductionist model, which 
seems to be the most efficacious. Instantiations of consciousness, or 
qualia, can be reduced to corresponding neurophysical mechanisms. 
This adheres to the basic tenets of Type-B and Type-C materialism; 
with further empirical investigation, the ambiguities surrounding 
phenomenal states will be explicated by neurophysical processes. 
Furthermore, as previously indicated, it is unclear how consciousness, 
or qualia, would be able to exert an effect within the physical realm. 
The Zombie Thought Experiment seems to reinforce this by 
inverting the archetypical issue of mental causation; if zombies are 
physical duplicates that behave in an identical manner yet lack qualia, 
then qualia have no role in affecting or determining behavior.48 
Epiphenomenalism—or what Chalmers designates as Type-E 
dualism—is the best available option.49 Consequently, there exists only 
an epistemic gap between neurophysical and phenomenal states. 
The phenomenal concept strategy serves as a valid challenge to 
Claim 2: the inclusion of an epistemic gap does not necessarily imply 
the existence of an ontological one. Chalmers forcefully claims that 
physicalism denies “the manifest” and the “further truth that we 
are conscious.” It can be argued, however, that phenomenal states 
simply assume the presence of ontologically separate and non-physical 
entities.50 According to this approach, physicalists can accept the 
conceivability of zombies while insisting that consciousness, or qualia, 
is a conceptually isolated phenomenal concept which is intrinsically 
related to the neurophysical.51 For example, there exists legitimate 
skepticism regarding the obviousness of qualia as ontologically separate 
from the standpoint of psychological language. If terms such as “pain” 
referred to private, subjective experiences, it would be expected that 
the derivation of the appropriate use of the term would only occur 
via introspection.52 Nevertheless, conceptual analysis of psychological 
language reveals that the usage of the word “pain” is learned by 
47 Jaworski, Philosophy of Mind, 229.
48 Kirk, “Zombies.”
49 Chalmers, Character of Consciousness, 144.
50 Peter Carruthers and B. Veillet, “The Phenomenal Concept Strategy,” 
Journal of Consciousness Studies 14, no. 9-10 (January 2007): 212-36.
51 Kirk, “Zombies.”
52 Jaworski, Philosophy of Mind, 217.
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associating linguistic behavior with non-linguistic behavior; it is not 
a private process.53 Moreover, by appeal to ontological naturalism, 
consciousness, or qualia, seems to not exist; if the behavior of the 
zombie can be exhaustively described by neurophysical mechanisms 
and is indistinguishable from its duplicate, then qualia may not exist. 
Additionally, it is unclear how such phenomenal states could emerge 
from neurophysical states. If there exists a gap between neurophysical 
and phenomenal descriptions, how would it be possible for 
neurophysical processes to give rise to consciousness, or qualia? There 
is no appropriate response from epiphenomenalism.54
Furthermore, the phenomenal concept strategy would offer an 
appropriate response to Claim 2 of the Knowledge Argument. As 
opposed to learning a new fact—regarding color—that operates outside 
the neurophysical description, Mary simply understands an “old fact 
in a new way”—i.e. she has acquired a phenomenal concept of a 
neurophysical mechanism. Ultimately, this phenomenal concept can 
be explicated in neurophysical terms.55 Consequently, phenomenal 
concepts can be reduced to physical properties of experiences.
In combination, Kim’s critique of mental causation and the 
phenomenal concept strategy serves as an effectual response to the 
anti-physicalist stance enclosed within the Knowledge Argument and 
the Zombie Thought Experiment. By demonstrating that subjective 
experience, or qualia, is causally inert and is not ontologically 
independent, this approach pushes advocates of anti-physicalism 
to accept epiphenomenalism as the only viable alternative. In turn, 
epiphenomenalism suffers from an inability to integrate with a 
naturalistic worldview and to respond to the problem of psychophysical 
emergence. Thus, the contention that the supposed existence of 
consciousness is sufficient reason for the failure of physicalism is  
not successful.
53 David W. Schaal, “Naming Our Concerns about Neuroscience: A Review 
of Bennett and Hackers Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience,” 
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 84, no. 3 (2005): 683-92.
54 Jaworski, Philosophy of Mind, 239.
55 Nida-Rümelin, “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument.”
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